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“For these [art] students, creativity was a ‘lovey-dovey cliché used by 
people who are not professionally involved with art.’” (Thornton 2008). 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This seminar focuses on the possibility of computational production of “artistic 
creativity”. That is, the production by a computer of some artifact that people would be 
prepared to label as a type of “art” (e.g., a painting, a piece of music or a piece of 
writing), where that artifact can be judged as creative.  
 
As the existence of creativity is a judgment, relative to personal or group norms (Boden 
1994) (Amabile 1993), it is important to understand what factors affect that judgment. 
Hence the “seminar question”— what are the appropriate methods and measures to 
objectively verify and validate creative behavior in artificial systems? 
 
In most cases, people judge creativity by evaluating the resulting artifact, after the 
productive behavior has been completed. Hence, we will concentrate on the artifact here. 
However, sometimes the artistic process is inferable by the evaluator, perhaps due to 
some attributes of the artifact, or sometimes it’s even observable. Colton (2008) argues 
that art is identified as more creative if the process that generated it is considered to be 
more creative. 
 
As processes that can be judged as creative can lead to very dull results, and dull 
processes can lead to artifacts that can be judged as creative, it’s best for the moment to 
focus on just one of the two (the artifact), and avoid these complex interactions.  
 
Creativity is an intelligent activity: intelligent activity is an area studied by AI. Hence 
computational creativity usually incorporates AI techniques. However, a significant issue 
for all AI research is the goal of the research. The goal of a researcher affects the 
methods they use, the assumptions they make, as well as the criteria used to determine 
the success or failure of their work. This is true too of computational creativity research. 
Consequently to compare, contrast and evaluate such research, the goals must be made 
clear. 
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Russell and Norvig (2003), for example, describe four different approaches to studying 
AI. One for example is concerned with simulating human thinking (“the cognitive 
modeling approach”) while another with acting rationally (“the rational agent approach”). 
These are analogous to focusing on producing creative reasoning versus producing 
creative results.  
 
The distinction between focusing on obtaining creative results, perhaps even regardless of 
how they are obtained, as opposed to making hypotheses about and simulating the 
underlying processes, is important. Systems based on Genetic Programming, for example, 
are able to produce remarkable results (Spector 2008). As they use a general method, it 
appears unlikely that they will tell us much about creativity: apart from the fact that 
computers are able to produce artifacts that are judged as creative. But that we already 
know.  
 
To my mind the two key ways to benefit from the computational study of creativity are  
a) to study what kinds of knowledge and reasoning might be part of a process that 
produces artifacts that are judged to be creative, and b) to study the criteria that a person 
or a system might use to judge whether an item is creative or not. 
 
In an earlier paper (Brown 2008) we made a similar point regarding Computational 
Design Creativity: i.e., the design of products, rather than artistic artifacts. In this paper 
we will focus on “b”, evaluation criteria. There already exists at least one well-tested set 
of attributes that people use to evaluate products for creativity (Besemer 2006). Products 
can also be evaluated by how well they meet their Requirements.  
 
For artistic creativity, requirements may not exist, and constraints on the artifact (the 
artistic “product”) are usually looser or absent. Many computational creativity systems 
produce artistic artifacts, but such results can be judged in a variety of ways: by a variety 
of artistic standards or by the perceiver’s “taste”, for example. There is less chance of a 
generated artifact being judged in a single, clear and concrete fashion, so the standards 
may be softer and perhaps easier to satisfy. With regard to taste, Boden (1994) quotes, “I 
don’t know anything about art, but I know what I like”. If this were true in general, then 
there would be as many tests of the creativity of an artifact as there are people! 
 
2. Evaluation Criteria 
 
Evaluation is needed during the creation process to prune possibilities in the very large 
spaces of possible results that exist with both products and artistic artifacts. It seems to be 
the case that a system or an individual can’t deliberately be creative without the ability to 
evaluate some or all of the factors that make the result creative (Boden 1994) (Eysenck 
1994) (Minsky 2006). 
 
For products, creativity assessment includes some evaluation of quality. Not all products 
are intended to be creative. For art, the underlying intention is already to be creative in 
some way or another. This author is not aware of any literature that lists and describes 
2
precise criteria used to evaluate how creative an artistic artifact might be: however, there 
is a lot of work discussing aesthetic properties. 
 
Besemer’s Creative Product Analysis Model (CPAM) (Besemer & Treffinger 1981) is the basis 
for a well-established, well-validated and practical product creativity assessment instrument 
called CPSS (Besemer 2006) (Horn & Salvendy 2006) (O’Quin & Besemer 1989). The model has 
three main factors: Novelty, Resolution and Style. Each of these factors has between 2-4 facets 
that further refine them. The CPSS is currently a web-based collection of questions that produces 
scores for each of the nine facets. The shape of the resulting creativity histogram indicates 
variations in creativity. The histogram acts as a creativity profile for the product. The factors and 
their facets are as follows (Besemer 2006). 
 
Novelty is “the extent of newness in the product” and refers to the “number and extent” 
of the new processes, new techniques and new concepts included in the product. It also 
refers to “the newness of the product both in and out of the field”. This factor is common 
to most models of creativity. The facets of novelty are:  
Surprising: “The product presents unexpected or unanticipated information to the 
user, listener, or viewer”. 
Original: “The product is unusual or infrequently seen in the universe of products 
made by people with similar experience and training”. 
 
Resolution is “the degree to which the product fits or meets the needs of the problematic 
situation”. For products at least, new but bizarre objects aren’t seen as creative, as 
products are usually associated with an intended function, and therefore being ‘useful’ is 
prized. The facets of resolution are:  
Logical: “The product or solution follows the acceptable and understood rules for 
the discipline”. 
Useful: “The product has clear practical applications”. 
Valuable: “The product is judged worthy because it fills a financial, physical, 
social, or psychological need”. 
Understandable: “The product is presented in a communicative, self-disclosing 
way, which is ‘user-friendly’”. 
 
Style is “the degree to which the product combines unlike elements into a refined, 
developed, coherent whole, statement or unit”; “how the product presents itself”; the 
“product’s personality”. It affects how creative the product is perceived to be, and may 
even impact how novel it seems. For example, a telephone covered in whittled wood 
would create a very different impression than a phone covered in fine leather. The facets 
of style are:  
Organic: “The product has a sense of wholeness or completeness about it. All the 
parts work well together”. 
Well-Crafted: “The product has been worked and reworked with care to develop it 
to its highest possible level for this point in time”. 
Elegant: “The product shows a solution that is expressed in a refined, understated 
way”. 
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Jirousek (1995) writes about the evaluation of visual design for functional objects: i.e., 
decorative objects with an intended purpose. Note that she is not explicitly concerned 
with evaluating creativity, just the quality of the visual components of the design. As her 
specialty is textiles, she approaches her criteria with a strong artistic bias, as opposed to 
Besemer’s purely product bias. She provides the distinguishing example of a bra made of 
barbed wire and plumbing fixtures—clearly not intended to function as clothing, but as 
art. We will return to the function of art later.  She distinguishes between the essential 
structure, and the “applied decorative design”. The former affects function, while the 
latter can but need not. Her criteria are as follows (Jirousek 1995). 
 
Form/Function: “Does the form follow function? Is the form or shape suitable to the 
intended purpose of the object?” 
Appropriateness of Materials: “Does the material used suit the function? Are the 
materials used appropriate and practical for the purpose?” 
Honest Use of Materials: “a) Are the materials used honestly? Does the material look 
like itself, or is it disguised? b) If the form and materials are disguised, is it 
justified? If the form and material are used imitatively, does the imitation make a 
positive aesthetic contribution?” 
Purpose: “What is the purpose of the applied decorative design? Is it necessary? Does it 
enhance the object's function?” 
Concept: “Is the applied decorative design harmonious in design and idea with the 
purpose of the object?” 
Spatial Placement: “Is the design ordered to relate to the space on which it is placed?” 
Structural Coherence: “Does the decorative design reinforce, or hide the structure?” 
Aesthetics: “Is the form and decoration well executed in terms of style, skill, and 
craftsmanship?” 
Telesis: “a) Are the form, decoration, and materials expressive of a particular time and 
culture? b) If they are expressive of a particular time and culture, are they utilized 
in a context that is congruent with and respectful of their origins?” 
Innovation: “Is the design a new expression, or merely a superficial change? Does it 
have individuality, or is it a cliché?” 
Longevity: “Has the form and design an appeal that can be sustained during the length of 
time the object will be used? Is it destined to be a fad or a classic?” 
 
Much more generally, Abrams (1986) describes four ways of considering the analysis, 
criticism or evaluation of art: Mimetic; Pragmatic; Expressive; Objective. Mimetic is 
concerned with imitating aspects of the observable universe, other than the artifact, artist 
or audience (i.e., artist as mirror). Pragmatic is concerned with the relationship between 
the artifact and the audience. This includes teaching and producing emotional reactions. 
Expressive is concerned with externalizing their inner life (i.e., artist as lamp). Objective 
is concerned with viewing the artifact in isolation. Of course, combinations are possible.  
 
3. Carrying Out an Evaluation 
 
One problem with art is that it “accumulates meaning through an extended collaborative 
act”, and that “Great art is essentially work that has proven inexhaustible in terms of the 
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value it gives to those who pay attention to it”: that is, its value is in terms of its 
accumulated “communicative connotations” (Thornton 2008). It is unclear whether a 
single source of evaluation is sufficient. But let’s suspend disbelief… 
 
Based on the selected evaluation criteria presented above there are a variety of issues to 
address.  
 
The first is whether Besemer’s nine facets (2006) can be used to evaluate the creativity of 
an artistic artifact, and also whether they should. The facets were developed after 
comprehensive and careful statistical analysis of terms used by human subjects to label 
products as creative or not. As they were judging ‘products’ with intended functionality, 
where practical use was fundamental, the application of Besemer’s nine facets to art is 
suspect, at best. However, it should be educational to try. The facets are Surprising, 
Original; Logical, Useful, Valuable, Understandable; Organic, Well-Crafted, Elegant. 
 
Art is almost by definition “original”, and is often “surprising”, especially for modern art. 
Note that the time of evaluation (or ‘viewing’ for art) is key: looking at an impressionist 
painting for the first time from today’s context, is quite different from seeing it for the 
first time at the time it was painted. It changes the possible judgments that a viewer can 
make. “Logical” is about following the rules for the discipline, and hence this will vary 
enormously with the type of media, and the intent of the artist: some art is about breaking 
the rules in order to increase originality. Art is not “useful” in the same way as a product 
is, and, although it may have a purpose, that is often unclear. Art can indeed be 
“valuable”, both in financial terms, and in other ways, so this facet seems to be a relevant. 
As for “understandable”, it is unusual for art to be “self-disclosing” and “user-friendly”. 
It is possible for an artistic artifact to be “organic” but not necessary. While art may be 
“well-crafted”, in the sense of “reworked”, that isn’t always clear to the viewer. In 
addition, it isn’t necessary for an artistic artifact to be “elegant” in order for it to be seen 
as creative or have high quality. So, overall, the result seems to be a partial match, but 
with most being very hard to produce computationally. 
 
We should expect Jirousek’s (1995) criteria for the evaluation of visual design for 
functional objects to be more successful than Besemer’s when applied to art, as the 
former is more concerned with artistic aspects.  
 
If we knew what the function of the artistic artifact actually was, then a judgment might 
be made about the relationship between form and function. Material suitability also 
depends on function, so that’s hard to judge. The “honest” use of materials might be 
possible to judge for an artwork, although it raises the problem of assessing a “positive 
aesthetic contribution”, which is rather recursive. Harmony and necessity relate to 
purpose. Can we even ask whether an artistic artifact is “necessary”?  As for the purpose 
of the “applied decorative design”, we’ll discuss this below. “Spatial Placement” and 
“Structural Coherence” both relate to the decorative design on a functional object, and, as 
a consequence are hard to apply to an artwork. The evaluation of “aesthetics” “in terms of 
style, skill, and craftsmanship” should be applicable to some art, but may require insight 
into the process used to produce the artifact. The issue of whether “form, decoration, and 
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materials” are “expressive of a particular time and culture” should apply to art, but is 
clearly non-trivial to assess. Innovation in art is similar to that in products: important for 
creativity but hard to judge. As for “longevity”, if dealers knew whether an artifact was to 
be a “fad or a classic” then they’d be very successful. However, making that judgment 
actually implies judging the quality of the artwork overall, plus understanding cultural 
trends: effectively predicting the future. 
 
One thing in common between Besemer’s and Jirousek’s systems of evaluation is that 
they both address the “purpose” of an artifact: i.e., what the artifact is for; why it exists. If 
these systems are to apply to art, then we need to ask “what is the purpose of art?” or 
more specifically, “what is the purpose of this particular artistic artifact?”. 
 
Jirousek (1995) suggests the following list of the purposes of art:  
• A vehicle for religious ritual; 
• Commemoration of an important event; 
• Propaganda; 
• Social Commentary; 
• Recording of visual data; 
• Creating beauty; 
• Story telling; 
• Conveying intense emotion. 
 
An alternative, overlapping list (Wikipedia 2009) suggests that art is for:  
• Communication; 
• Entertainment; 
• Political change; 
• Psychological and healing purposes; 
• Social inquiry, subversion and/or anarchy; 
• Propaganda or commercialism. 
 
Could any of these be detected reliably by a person? Could any of these be detected 
reliably by a computational system? It seems unlikely: but for any evaluation criteria that 
relate to purpose we would need to. As the titles of artistic artifacts become more obscure 
(e.g., The Physical Impossibility of Death in the Mind of Someone Living) and provide 
less assistance, the viewer has to decide which possible purpose or purposes the work 
might have, and pick the most likely.  
 
In a similar way, the evaluation of an artistic artifact might depend on whether it was 
possible to detect whether the artist intended a mimetic, pragmatic, expressive or 
objective stance (Abrams 1986), as well as which stance the viewer adopts. Evaluating its 
imitative qualities, its ability to teach or produce emotions, its ability to convey the artists 
“inner life”, all seem very hard. In addition, evaluating the artifact as an artifact (art for 
art’s sake) requires knowledge about art, its conventions and forms. 
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4. Conclusions 
 
It is clear that the quality and creativity of an artistic artifact is evaluated differently 
depending on whom is doing the evaluation: e.g., “beauty is in the eye of the beholder”. It 
also depends on the time, as well as physical and cultural context of the evaluation. Some 
past art was intended to show beautiful things, and past evaluations were done with that 
expectation. These days artists struggle to express themselves, try to affect our emotions 
or teach us about extreme social conditions. Art in general is becoming more extreme.  
 
Our evaluations of an artistic artifact can be done in a very large number of different 
ways. How an artwork affects our emotions will vary from person to person. Whether we 
can detect the purpose of an artwork and think it worthy will vary from person to person. 
Whether emotions or purpose can be determined by a computer is in great doubt. Even 
the fundamental judgment of novelty is extremely difficult, more so than with products: 
although that’s already very hard. The space of possible artworks is huge, so 
computational confirmation of novelty (originality and surprise) will be extremely 
difficult.  
 
My belief is that to be interesting a Computational Artistic Creativity system must be able 
to either evaluate its own output for creativity (or at the very least for quality), or, more 
importantly, be able to evaluate its partial solutions for creative potential so that it can 
choose between possibilities. For Computational Design Creativity systems that design 
products I think that this is possible: for Computational Artistic Creativity systems I have 
very grave doubts. 
 
 
References  
 
Abrams MH (1953) Orientation of Critical Theories. From: The Mirror and the 
Lamp. In: Twentieth Century Literary Theory: an Introductory Anthology.  V. 
Lambropoulos and D. N. Miller (Eds.), 1986, Albany: SUNY Press, pp. 3-31. 
 
Amabile TM (1983) The Social Psychology of Creativity, Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 43: 997-1013. 
 
Besemer SP and Treffinger DJ (1981) Analysis of Creative Products: Review and 
Synthesis, Journal of Creative Behavior, 15: 158-178. 
 
Besemer SP (2006) Creating Products in the Age of Design. New Forums Press, Inc. 
 
Boden MA (1994) What is Creativity?, in MA Boden (ed.), Dimensions of Creativity. 
The MIT Press, pp. 75-117. 
 
Brown DC (March 2008) Guiding Computational Design Creativity Research, Proc. 
NSF International Workshop on Studying Design Creativity'08, University of 
7
Provence, France. http://www.cs.wpi.edu/~dcb/Papers/sdc08-paper-Brown-25-
Feb.pdf 
 
Colton S (2008) Creativity versus the Perception of Creativity in Computational 
Systems. Proc. AAAI Spring Symposium on Creative Systems. 
 
Eysenck HJ (1994) The Measurement of Creativity, in MA Boden (ed.), Dimensions 
of Creativity. MIT Press, pp. 199-242. 
 
Horn D and Salvendy G (2006) Consumer-Based Assessment of Product Creativity: 
A Review and Reappraisal, Human Factors and Ergonomics in Manufacturing, 
16(2): 155. 
 
Jirousek C (1995) Art, Design and Visual Thinking.  http://char.txa.cornell.edu/, 
accessed 1st June 2009. 
 
Minsky M (2006) The Emotion Machine: Commonsense Thinking, Artificial 
Intelligence, and the Future of the Human Mind. Simon & Schuster. 
 
O’Quin K and Besemer SP (1989) Development, Reliability, and Validity of the 
Revised Creative Product Semantic Scale, Creativity Research Journal, 2: 267-278. 
 
Russell SJ and Norvig P (2003) Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach. 2nd 
edition. Prentice Hall.  
 
Spector L (ed.) (2008) Genetic Programming for Human-Competitive Designs, 
Special Issue, AI EDAM, 22(3). 
 
Thornton S (2008) Seven Days in the Art World. W. W. Norton & Co., Inc. 
 
Wikipedia (2009) Art, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Art, accessed 1st June 2009. 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________ 
Version: 6/12/2009 4:37 PM 
 
 
8
